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Abstract
We analyze the security for network code when the eavesdropper can contaminate the information on the
attacked edges (active attack) and can choose the attacked edges adaptively (adaptive attack). We show that active
and adaptive attacks cannot improve the performance of the eavesdropper when the code is linear. Further, we give
an non-linear example, in which an adaptive attack improves the performance of the eavesdropper. We derive the
capacity for the unicast case and the capacity region for the multicast case or the multiple multicast case in several
examples of relay networks, beyond the minimum cut theorem, when no additional random number is allowed as
scramble variables in the intermediate nodes.
Index Terms
secrecy analysis, secure network coding, adaptive attack, active attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding is a method securely transmitting information from the authorized sender to the authorized
receiver. Cai and Yeung [1], [2], [3] discussed the secrecy for the malicious adversary, Eve, wiretapping a subset
EE of all channels in the network. The papers [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] developed several types of secure
network coding. The papers [11], [12], [13], [14] showed the existence of a secrecy code that universally works for
any types of eavesdroppers under the size constraint of EE . In particular, the papers [13], [14] constructed it by
using the universal hashing lemma [15], [16], [17]. Further, the papers [11], [12], [18] evaluated errors when the
information on a part of network is changed, but they evaluated the secrecy only when the information on a part of
network is not changed or Eve did not know the replaced information. The recent paper [19] discussed the secrecy
as well as the error when Eve contaminates the eavesdropped information and knows the replaced information. (For
the detailed relation, see [19, Remark 8].) The effects of Eve’s contamination depend on the type of the network
code. When the code is linear, the contamination does not improve her performance. However, when the code is
not linear, there exists only one example where the contamination improves her performance [19].
Despite these developments, there are still some problems in existing studies. Although these existing studies
achieved the optimal rate with secrecy condition, their optimality relies on the minimum cut theorem. That is, they
assumed that the eavesdropper may choose any r-subset channels to access, and did not address another type of
conditions for the eavesdropper. For example, the studies [11], [12], [13], [14] optimized only the codes in the
source and terminal nodes and did not optimize the coding operations on the intermediate nodes. Also, in other
existing studies, the intermediate nodes do not have as complicated codes as the source and terminal nodes. In this
paper, to achieve the optimal rate beyond the minimum cut theorem, we address the optimization of the coding
operations on the intermediate nodes as well as on the source and terminal nodes.
Further, we consider a new type of attacks, adaptive attacks. Assume that distinct numbers are assigned to the
edges, and the communication on edges are done in the decreasing order for the assigned numbers. Usually, Eve
cannot decide the edges to be attacked depending on the previous observation. Now, we allow Eve to choose
the edges to be attacked based on the previous observations. Indeed, the channel discrimination, it is known that
such an adaptive strategy does not improve the asymptotic performance [20]. Then, we find two characteristics for
adaptive attacks, which are similar to the case of active attacks. First, we find a non-linear code where an adaptive
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attack significantly improves Eve’s performance. Using this characteristic, we find an example of a non-asymptotic
network model, which has no secure code for adaptive attacks, but has no secure code for conventional attacks.
Second, we show that any adaptive attack cannot improve Eve’s performance when the code is linear. Using this
fact, we derive the asymptotic performance in several typical network models in the following way when Eve is
allowed to use adaptive and active attacks.
In this paper, we discuss the asymptotic securely transmittable rate over the above attacks not only for a unicast
network but also for a multiple multicast network, in which, multiple senders are intended to send their different
messages to different multiple receivers. Under these settings, we define the capacity and the capacity regions for
given network models, and calculate them in several examples. For the definition, we define two types of capacity
regions depending on the requirement on the code on the intermediate nodes. Usually, a secure network code employs
scramble random numbers, which need to be physical random numbers different from pseudo random numbers. In
the first capacity region, we allow each node to introduce new scramble random numbers unlimitedly. Here, the
scramble random numbers of each node are not shared with other nodes and should be independent of random
variables in other players and other nodes before starting the transmission. In the second capacity region, only
source nodes are allowed to employ scramble random numbers due to the following reason. To realize physical
random numbers as scramble random numbers, we need a physical device. If the physical random number has
sufficient quality, the physical device is expensive and/or consumes a non-negligible space because it often needs
high level quantum information technologies with advanced security analysis [21], [22]. It is not so difficult to
prepare such devices in the source side. However, it increases the cost to prepare devices in the intermediate nodes
because networks with such devices require more complicated maintenance than a conventional network. Therefore,
from the economical reason, it is natural to impose this constraint to our network code. Unfortunately, only a few
papers [23], [24], [25] discussed such a restriction. Hence, this paper addresses the difference between the capacities
with and without such a restriction by introducing the no-randomness capacity and the full-randomness capacity.
Further, as an intermediate case, by introducing the limited-randomness capacity, we can consider the case when
the number of available scramble random numbers in each intermediate node is limited to a certain amount. Then,
the relation between our capacities and the existing studies is summarized as Table I. In addition, for both types of
capacities and capacity regions, we define the linear codes version, in which, our codes are limited to linear codes.
We also show that the linear version of capacities and capacity regions are the same as the original capacities and
capacity regions under the above examples because the optimal rate and rate regions in the original setting can be
attained by linear codes.
The remaining parts of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the formulation of our network model.
Section III gives an example of network model, in which, an adaptive attack efficiently improves Eve’s performance.
To discuss the asymptotic setting, Section IV defines the capacity region. Section V discusses the relay network
model and derives its capacity. Section VII discusses the homogenous multicast network model and derives its
capacity. Section VIII discusses the homogenous multiple multicast network model and derives its capacity. In
Section VI, we give an important lemma, which is used in the converse part in the above models.
II. ADAPTIVE AND ACTIVE ATTACK FOR GENERAL NETWORK
A. Formulation and reduction to non-adaptive attack
Now, we give the most general formulation of network coding and adaptive and active attacks. We consider an
acyclic general network with multiple multicast setting as follows. The network has a source nodes, b terminal nodes,
several intermediate nodes, and ` edges, where each edge is assigned to a distinct number from [`] := {1, . . . , `}.
Hence, [`] can be regarded as the set of edges. Each edge transmits a single letter on a finite set X . Our task is the
following. The i-th source node securely sends the message Mi,j to the j-th terminal node, where the messages
are subject to independent uniform distribution. Here, the tuple of all messages are denoted by M .
Next, we assume that as scramble random numbers, each intermediate node can use additional uniform random
numbers, which are independent of other random variables. They might be realized as physical random numbers.
The i-th source node converts the pair of the messages (Mi,1, . . . ,Mi,b) and the scramble random numbers to the
tuple of the letters on the outgoing edges. Each intermediate node converts the pair of the letters on the incoming
edges and the scramble random numbers to the tuple of the letters on the outgoing edges. The j-th terminal node
converts the pair of the letters on the incoming edges to the tuple of the recovered messages (Mˆ1,j , . . . , Mˆa,j). We
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON WITH EXISTING RESULTS
Active Adaptive Node Linearityattack attack randomness
Papers [1], [2], [3], [6] not allowed not allowed not allowed scalar
Paper [4] not allowed not allowed allowed non-linear
Papers [9], [10], [23], [24], [25] not allowed not allowed allowed scalar
Papers [5], [8] not allowed not allowed not allowed scalar
Papers [13], [14], [11] not allowed not allowed not allowed vector
Papers [12], [35] semi active attack not allowed not allowed vector
Paper [19] allowed not allowed not allowed vector/non-linear
Our non-linear example not allowed allowed not allowed non-linear
No-randomness capacity allowed allowed not allowed vector
Limited-randomness capacity allowed allowed partially vector
Full-randomness capacity allowed allowed allowed vector
Node randomness expresses the random number generated in intermediate nodes, which is independent of the variables in other nodes and
other players before starting the transmission. Linearity expresses whether the code is linear or not. When it is linear, the column expresses
which linearity condition is imposed, scalar or vector linearity. These two kinds of linearity conditions are explained in Section V-E. Semi
active attack means that Eve injects the noise in several nodes and eavesdrops several nodes, but she estimates the message only from the
eavesdropped information on the node without use of the information of the noise. For the detailed relation for active attack, see Remark 8
of [19].
denote a network code by Φ. We denote the cardinality of the message Mi,j by |Φ|i,j . When a = 1, we simply
denote it by |Φ|j . In particular, when a = b = 1, we simply denote it by |Φ|. We denote the set of codes by C0.
Now, we consider two conditions for our network code Φ.
(C1) [Linearity] Any message, any scramble random number, and information on any edge can be given as
elements of vector spaces over the finite field Fq All of the conversions in source, intermediate, and
terminal nodes are linear over Fq, i.e., they are written as matrices whose entries are elements of Fq.
Then, the code is called linear with respect to Fq1.
Here, to apply the linearity condition, we choose a subset of X whose cardinality is a power of q. Then,
the information on any edge can be given as an element of vector space over the finite field Fq. While
all edges sent the information on the same set X , the above subset might depend on the edge. This is
because the dimension of the information to be sent depends on the edge in general. Since the cardinality
of the set X is an arbitrary number, we can apply this linearity condition to the case when X is a given
as the n-th power of a certain set.
(C2) [No-randomness] All of intermediate nodes have no scramble random numbers.
(C2’) [Limited-randomness] Each limited intermediate node has limited scramble random numbers. When each
group is composed of one node, as a typical example, we assume that the node in i-th group can use γi
random numbers per transmission.
Next, we define Eve’s attack. The conventional attack is modeled by a collection A0 of subset of [`]. That is,
in the conventional attack, Eve chooses a subset s ∈ A0, and eavesdrops the edges in the subset s. This types of
attack is called a deterministic attack. Hence, the set of deterministic attacks is identified with A0. The following
discussion depends on the collection A0 of subset of [`]. That is, our problem is characterized by the structure
of network and the collection A0. Also, Eve can randomly choose her choice s. Such an attack is written as a
probability distribution PS and is called a randomized attack. We denote the set of randomized attacks by A¯0.
In this paper, we allow Eve to adaptively choose the edges to be eavesdropped. For simplicity, we assume
that all subsets in the collection A0 have the same cardinality ζ. While Eve is allowed to eavesdrop ζ edges,
she can adaptively choose them as follows. She chooses the first edge α1 ∈ [`] to be eavesdropped, and obtains
the information Z1 ∈ X on the edge. Based on the information Z1, she chooses the second edge α2(Z1) ∈ [`]
1This type of linear code is often called vector linear [26] because these random variables are given as elements of vector spaces over the
finite field Fq . Although the paper [26] assumes that all the messages, the scramble random numbers, and the variables on the edges have
the same dimension, we do not assume this condition.
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to be eavesdropped and obtains the information Z2 ∈ X on the edge. In this way, based on the information
Z1, . . . , Zj−1, she chooses the j-th edge αj(Z1, . . . , Zj−1) ∈ [`] to be eavesdropped and obtains the information
Zj ∈ X on the edge. Since the choice of the set α = {α1, . . . , αζ} of attacked edges is given as a function of ζ−1
outcomes z1, . . . , zζ−1, it is often written as α(z1, . . . , zζ−1) to clarify this point. Here, for any data z1, . . . , zζ−1,
α(z1, . . . , zζ−1) is required to belong to the family A0. This type of attack is called a general adaptive attack.
In this type of attack, the order of eavesdropped edges has no relation with the numbers assigned to the edges.
A general adaptive attack α = (α1, . . . , αζ) is called a time-ordered adaptive attack when α1 < α2(z1) < . . . <
αζ(z1, . . . , zζ−1). Although a general adaptive attack has less practical meaning than a time-ordered adaptive attack,
we consider a general adaptive attack due to its mathematical simplicity. We denote the sets of time-ordered adaptive
attacks and general adaptive attacks by A1 and A2, respectively. The sets of their randomizations are written as
A¯1 and A¯2, respectively. Now, we identify the set of deterministic attacks with the collection A0. Considering a
constant function α, which does not depend on ζ − 1 outcomes z1, . . . , zζ−1, we can consider the collection A0 as
a subset of A1 while A1 ⊂ A2.
Next, we consider a more powerful attack than a time-ordered adaptive attack α = (α1, . . . , αζ). Although Eve
decides the eavesdropped edges in the same way as the time-ordered adaptive attack α = (α1, . . . , αζ), she is
allowed to change the information Zj on the j-th eavesdropped edge αj(Z1, . . . , Zj−1) to βj(Z1, . . . , Zj), which
is a function of her observations Z1, . . . , Zj . This kind of attack is called an adaptive and active attack and is
written as the pair (α,β) of α = (α1, . . . , αζ) and β = (β1, . . . , βζ). We denote the set of adaptive and active
attacks (such functions) by A3. The sets of the randomizations are written as A¯3. When α does not depends on her
observations Z1, . . . , Zζ−1, α is a deterministic attack and the pair (α,β) is called an active attack. Indeed, when
active attack is made, the information on the network is changed. However, in this paper, we do not care about the
correctness of the recovered information when active attack is made. We consider the correctness in the decoding
only when no active attack is made, i.e., we discuss only the secrecy when active attack is made.
Hence, we have the relations A0 ⊂ A1 ⊂ A2,A0 ⊂ A1 ⊂ A3, and A¯0 ⊂ A¯1 ⊂ A¯2, A¯0 ⊂ A¯1 ⊂ A¯3. We also
assume that there is no error in any edges except for the eavesdropped edge.
Under a code Φ and an attack (α,β) ∈ A3, we denote the mutual information between the messages and Eve’s
observations Z = (Z1, . . . , Zζ) by I(M ;Z)Φ,(α,β). Also, under an attack α ∈ A2 we denote it by I(M ;Z)Φ,α.
In addition, an attack P ∈ A¯i with i = 0, 1, 2, 3, we denote it by I(M ;Z)Φ,P . Then, for any attack P ∈ A¯i for
i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and a network code Φ, we can choose an attack x ∈ Ai such that I(M ;Z)Φ,P ≥ I(M ;Z)Φ,x. That
is, we have
min
P∈A¯i
I(M ;Z)Φ,P = min
x∈Ai
I(M ;Z)Φ,x (1)
for i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
First, we consider the case when the network code is not necessarily linear. Then, we have the following theorem2
when Yi expresses the information on the edge i.
Theorem 1. Assume that a network code Φ satisfies the following condition. Given an arbitrary element ~s =
{s1, . . . , sζ} ∈ A0, we have
H(M |Ys1 = z1, . . . , Ysζ = zζ) = H(M |Ys1 , . . . , Ysζ)s (2)
for any element (z1, . . . , zζ). Then, any general adaptive attack α ∈ A2 satisfies
I(M ;Z)Φ,α ≤ max
s∈A0
I(M ;Z)s. (3)

Theorem 1 will be shown in the next subsection. Since I(M ;Z)Φ,s = 0 for any s ∈ A0 implies the condition
(2), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. When the relation
I(M ;Z)Φ,s = 0 (4)
2 Even when the cardinality d of each channel is different from q, this theorem still holds.
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holds for an arbitrary element s ∈ A0, any general adaptive attack α ∈ A2 satisfies
I(M ;Z)Φ,α = 0. (5)

This corollary guarantees that perfect security for any deterministic attack (4) implies perfect security for any
general adaptive attack (5) without the linearity condition. Notice that the mutual information leaked to wiretapper
is not zero in the counter example given in Section III.
In the case of linear network codes, we have the following lemma, which will be shown in the next subsection.
Lemma 1. Let M be the message and L be the scramble random variable. We assume that they are subject to the
independent uniform distribution. For a linear function f1, we define the variable X := f1(M,L). We choose a
linear function g = (g1, g2) such that g(x) ∈ f−11 (x). Then,
PM,X(m,x) = PM,X(m− g1(x), 0). (6)

When the message M and the scramble random variable L are subject to the independent uniform distribution,
applying Lemma 1 to the case when X = (Ys1 , . . . , Ysζ), we have
H(M |Ys1 = z1, . . . , Ysζ = zζ) = H(M |Ys1 = 0, . . . , Ysζ = 0), (7)
which implies the condition (2). Hence, Theorem 1 guarantees the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume that a network code Φ is linear with respect to a certain finite field Fq. When the message
M and the scramble random variable L are subject to the independent uniform distribution, any general adaptive
attack α ∈ A2 satisfies (3). 
Further, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 ([19, Theorem 1]). Assume that a network code Φ is linear. Any adaptive and active attack (α,β) ∈
A3 satisfies
I(M ;Z)Φ,(α,β) = I(M ;Z)Φ,α. (8)

Although the paper [19] shows Proposition 1 only for an active attack, the proof can be extended to an adaptive
and active attack. That is, the reduction from an adaptive and active attack (α,β) ∈ A3 to an adaptive attack
α ∈ A2 can be shown in the same way as [19, Theorem 1]. Therefore, when Φ is a linear code, combing the above
fact and (1), we find the relations
min
α∈A3
I(M ;Z)Φ,β = min
(α,β)∈A2
I(M ;Z)Φ,β = min
s∈A0
I(M ;Z)Φ,s. (9)
That is, when a network code is linear, we can restrict Eve’s attacks to deterministic attacks.
Remark 1. Here, we remark the difference between our adaptive attack and the adaptive attack in [34]. The paper
[34] considers the following attack when the code has block length n and the sender sends information to the
receiver n times. The eavesdropper can change the nodes to be attacked on the i-th transmission by using the
information obtained by the previous attacks. However, in our setting, the eavesdropper can change the node to be
attacked during one transmission from the sender to the receiver.
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B. Proofs of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1
Proof of Theorem 1: We have
H(M |Z)Φ,α
=
∑
z1
∑
z2
· · ·
∑
zζ
PYα1 ,Y2(z1),...,Yαζ(z1,z2,...,zζ−1)H(M |Yα1 = z1, Yα2(zs1) = z2, . . . , Yαζ(z1,z2,...,zζ−1) = zζ)
=
∑
z1
∑
z2
· · ·
∑
zζ
PYα1 ,Y2(z1),...,Yαζ(z1,z2,...,zζ−1)H(M |Yα1 , Yα2(zs1), . . . , Yαζ(z1,z2,...,zζ−1))
≥ min
s∈A0
H(M |Ys1 , . . . , Ysζ). (10)
This relation implies (3).
Proof of Lemma 1: Given x,m, we have
{l|f1(m, l) = x} = {l|f1(m− g1(x), l − g2(x)) = 0}. (11)
So, we have
|{l|f1(m, l) = x}| = |{l|f1(m− g1(x), l) = 0}|. (12)
Hence, we have (6).
III. NETWORK WITH POWERFUL ADAPTIVE ATTACK
In this section, to consider when adaptive attack is more powerful than deterministic attack, we address the single
shot setting, in which, the sender sends only one element of Fp, which is called the scalar linearity. Although this
section addresses the scalar linearity, Theorem 1 holds under vector linearity.
It is known that there exists a linear imperfectly secure code over a finite field Fq of a sufficiently large prime
power q when Eve may access a subset of channels that does not contain a cut between Alice and Bob even when
the linear code does not employ private randomness in the intermediate nodes [36]3. Theorem 1 guarantees that
such a linear code is still imperfectly secure even for active and adaptive attack over the same network. However,
it is not clear whether there exists such a linear imperfectly secure code over a finite field Fp of prime p. We
consider this problem over the finite field F2 in order to investigate the importance of the linearity condition in
Theorem 1. The previous paper [19, Section VII] showed that there exists no imperfectly secure code over active
attacks under a toy network while there exists a imperfectly secure code over deterministic attacks. In that network
model, non-linear code realizes the imperfect security over active attacks. In this section, we show that there exists
no imperfectly secure code over adaptive attacks in the same network model.
The toy network model given in [19, Section VII] is the network of Fig. 1, whose edges are E = {e(1), e(2), e(3), e(4)}.
Each edge e(i) is assumed to send the binary information ~Yi. No scramble random variable is allowed in the
intermediate node, which is the condition (C2). Eve is allowed to attack two edges of E except for the pairs
{e(1), e(2)} and {e(3), e(4)}. That is, A0 = {{e(1), e(3)}, {e(2), e(3)}, {e(1), e(4)}, {e(1), e(4)}}. We adopt a
imperfect security criterion in this section. When ZE is Eve’s information and I(M ;ZE) < 1 for all of Eve’s
possible attacks, we say that the code is imperfectly secure. Otherwise, it is called insecure. That is, when there
exists no function ψ˜ such that ψ˜(ZE) = M , our code is imperfectly secure. We consider the case when the sender
transmits only the binary message M ∈ F2 and any edge can transmit only a binary information. As shown in
[19, Theorem 4 of Section VII], there is no imperfectly secure linear code over finite field Fp with prime p for
deterministic attacks. In other words, no linear code over finite field Fp can realize the situation that Eve cannot
recover the message M perfectly with deterministic attack.
3In contrast, the paper [11] discussed a similar code construction by increasing n (vector linearity) while it did not increase the size of q.
The paper [37] extended this type of vector linearity setting of imperfectly secure codes to the case with multi-source multicast.
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Y1 Y3
Y2 Y4
source terminate
Fig. 1. Non-linear code.
Now, we prepare the binary uniform scramble random variable L ∈ F2. We consider the following code. The
encoder φ is given as
Y1 := L, Y2 := M + L. (13)
Then, we consider non-linear code in the intermediate node as
Y3 := Y1(Y2 + Y1) = Y1(Y2 + 1), (14)
Y4 := (Y1 + 1)(Y2 + Y1) = (Y1 + 1)Y2. (15)
The decoder ψ is given as ψ(Y3, Y4) := Y3 + Y4. Since Y3 and Y4 are given as follows under this code;
Y3 = LM, Y4 = LM +M, (16)
the decoder can recover M nevertheless the value of L.
The leaked information for the deterministic attack is calculated as follows. As shown in [19, Appendix B], the
mutual information and the l1 norm security measure of these cases are calculated to
I(M ;Y1, Y3) = I(M ;Y1, Y4)
=I(M ;Y2, Y3) = I(M ;Y2, Y4) =
1
2
, (17)
d1(M |Y1, Y3) = d1(M |Y1, Y4)
=d1(M |Y2, Y3) = d1(M |Y2, Y4) = 1
2
, (18)
where the l1 norm security measure d1(X|Y ) is defined as d1(X|Y ) :=
∑
y
∑
x | 1|X |PY (y)− PXY (xy)| by using
the cardinality |X | of the set of outcomes of the variable X . In this section, we choose the base of the logarithm to
be 2. Therefore, we find that this code is secure for deterministic attacks. That is, we find that there exists a secure
code over deterministic attacks. Further, as shown in [19, Lemma 3 of Section VII], when Eve cannot recover the
message M perfectly with any deterministic attack in the code, the network code is limited to this code or a code
equivalent to this code. This fact shows that there exists no imperfectly secure code over active attacks.
Now, we show that there exists no imperfectly secure code even for adaptive attacks without active modification.
Due to the above observation, it is sufficient to show that there exists an adaptive attack to recover the message M
for the above given code. Here, we give two types of adaptive attacks to recover the message M as follows.
(i) First, Eve eavesdrops e(1). When Y1 = 1, she eavesdrops e(3). Then, she recovers M as Y3 = Y2 + 1 =
Y2 + Y1 = M . When Y1 = 0, she eavesdrops e(4) Then, she recovers M as Y4 = Y2 = Y2 + Y1 = M .
(ii) First, Eve eavesdrops e(2). When Y2 = 1, she eavesdrops e(4). Then, she recovers M as Y4 = Y1 + 1 =
Y1 + Y2 = M . When Y2 = 0, she eavesdrops e(3) Then, she recovers M as Y3 = Y1 = Y1 + Y2 = M .
Therefore, we find that this code is not imperfectly secure even for adaptive attacks without active modification.
That is, there exists no imperfectly secure code over adaptive attacks in this network model. This fact shows that
an adaptive attack is powerful for this kind of non-linear code as an active attack even when it has no active
modification. The discussion in this section is summarized as Table II.
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TABLE II
SUMMARY FOR ONE HOP RELAY NETWORK (FIG. 1) WITH SINGLE SHOT SETTING
Code deterministic attack adaptive attack
linear code over Fp with prime p insecure insecure
linear code over Fq with imperfectly secure imperfectly securesufficiently large prime power q
non-linear code over F2 imperfectly secure insecure
IV. ASYMPTOTIC FORMULATION
Next, given a network and the collection A0, we consider the capacity and the capacity region depending on
the restrictions on the codes. Due to (1), in the following, we do not consider randomization of Eve’s attack. We
assume that each edge transmits {1, . . . , d}n when we use channel at n times, where the number n is called the
block-length. Given integers n and d, we apply the formulation (including the linearity) given in Section II-A to
the case when X is given as {1, . . . , d}n. In this sense, the linearity condition (C1) is defined with block-length n,
and Theorem 1 can be applied in this discussion. Then, dependently of the block length n, we denote Ai and C0
by Ain and C
0
n, respectively, although the collection A
0
n does not depend on n. First, we focus only on an adaptive
attack α ∈ A2n. Since there is no noise, we denote the decoding error probability depends only on our code Φ ∈ C0n.
Hence, we denote it by Pe(Φ). Then, we impose the following two conditions to our code Φ ∈ C0n.
(C3) [Reliability] The relation Pe(Φ) = 0.
(C4) [Secrecy] The relation I(M ;Z)Φ,α = 0 holds for α ∈ A2n.
We denote the set of codes satisfying the above two conditions by C1n. Additionally, we denote the set of codes
satisfying the no-randomness condition (C2) as well as these two conditions by C2n. In the unicast case, i.e., the
case with a = b = 1, we define the full-randomness capacity C1 and the no-randomness capacity C2 as
Ci := sup
n
sup
Φ∈Cin
1
n
log |Φ|, i = 1, 2. (19)
Here, we should remark that we impose no linearity condition for our code. From the definition, we have the
relation
C2 ≤ C1. (20)
In the multiple multicast case, we define the full-randomness capacity region C1 and the no-randomness capacity
region C2 as
Ci′ := sup
n
sup
Φ∈Ci′n
{( 1
n
log |Φ|i,j)i,j}, i′ = 1, 2. (21)
Similar to (20), we have the relation
C2 ⊂ C1. (22)
Next, we consider the case when each node has limited randomness, which is given as the condition (C2’). Since
this generalized case is complicated, we discuss this generalized setting only with the unicast case. Further, we
suppose that each group is composed of one node. Then, as in the condition (C2’), we assume that the node in i-th
group can use γi random numbers Ti per transmission. We denote the set of codes satisfying this condition with
length n by Cn[(γi)i]. Then, we define the capacity C[(γi)i] with limited randomness as
C[(γi)i] := sup
n
sup
Φ∈Cn[(γi)i]
1
n
log |Φ|. (23)
To clarify the effect by the linearity restriction, we denote the capacity and capacity region by Ci,L and Ci,L,
respectively when the linearity restriction (C1) is imposed to our codes. Then, we have the relation Ci,L ≤ Ci and
Ci,L ⊂ Ci. Also, the capacity with limited randomness with linearity restriction (C1) to our codes is denoted by
C[(γi)i]L.
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Restricting Eve’s attack to the deterministic attacks A0n, we define the above type of capacities and capacity
regions, which are denoted by Ci,D, Ci,L,D, C[(γi)i]D, C[(γi)i]L,D, Ci,D and Ci,L,D, respectively. Then, we have the
relations Ci,L,D = Ci,L, Ci,D ≥ Ci, Ci,L,D = Ci,L, Ci,D ⊃ Ci, and the similar relations.
Now, we address the case when an adaptive and active attack β ∈ A3n is allowed for Eve. In this case, we replace
the condition (C4) by the following condition;
(C4’) [Secrecy] The relation I(M ;Z)Φ,β = 0 holds for β ∈ A3n.
However, we do not replace (C3) by the following robustness condition;
Pe(Φ,β) = 0 for ∀β ∈ A3n, (24)
where Pe(Φ,β) is the decoding error probability with our code Φ when Eve makes the attack β. This situation can
be justified in the following way when free public channel with no error is available. In this case, to communicate
each other securely, they need to share secret random variables. To generate secret random variables, they send
secret random variables via the secure network coding. The secrecy of the generated random variables is guaranteed
by the secrecy condition (C4). That is, condition (4) is definitely needed. However, the robustness condition (24) is
not necessary because they can check whether the transmitted random number is correct by the error verification
test with the public channel after the transmission [27, Section VIII] [28, Step 4 of Protocol 2]. Hence, we impose
the condition (C3) instead of (24). Replacing the condition (C4) by the condition (C4’), we define the above type of
capacities and capacity regions, which are denoted by Ci,AC , Ci,L,AC , C[(γi)i]AC , C[(γi)i]L,AC , Ci,AC and Ci,L,AC ,
respectively. Then, we have the relations Ci,L,AC = Ci,L, Ci,D ≥ Ci,AC , Ci,L,AC = Ci,L, Ci,D ⊃ Ci,AC , and the
similar relations. In summary, for each i = 1, 2, we have
Ci,L,AC = Ci,L = Ci,L,D ⊂ Ci,AC ⊂ Ci ⊂ Ci,D. (25)
That is, when the equality Ci,D = Ci,L,D holds, all the capacities have the same value. In other cases, we have
similar relations.
Example 1. Now, as a typical example, we consider a single source acyclic network where Eve may choose
any r-subset channels to access, which we call r-wiretap network [1], [2], [30], [31]. That is, A0 is given as
{s ⊂ [`] : |s| = r}. To discuss the capacities of the given network, we introduce two kinds of minimum cuts. To
define them, we define a pseudo source node as a node that has only out-going edges but has no original message to
be transmitted. A pseudo source node is classified as an intermediate node because it is not the source node nor the
terminal node. The first type of minimum cut mincut1 is the minimum number of edges crossing a line separating
the source node and the terminal node. The second type of minimum cut mincut2 is the minimum number of edges
crossing a line separating the source node and the terminal node with removing all edges out-going from pseudo
source nodes. That, while edges out-going from pseudo source nodes are ignored in mincut2, they are counted in
mincut1. For r-wiretap network, we have
C2,L,AC = C2,L = C2,L,D = C2,AC = C2 = C2,D = mincut2−r. (26)
mincut2−r ≤ C1,L,AC = C1,L = C1,L,D ≤ C1,AC ≤ C1 ≤ C1,D ≤ mincut1−r. (27)
When the network has no pseudo source node, mincut2 = mincut1, which implies the equalities in (27). For
example, the network given in Fig. 2 shows a network has different rates mincut1 and mincut2. This network has
a linear code to realize mincut1−r when r = 1, which implies the equalities in (27).
The relations (26) and (27) can be shown as follows. It was shown in [2, Section III] that the rate mincut2−r is
achievable by a linear code where only source node generates randomness when Eve is allowed to use deterministic
attack. However, any adaptive and active attack is reduced to deterministic attack under a linear code. Hence, we
obtain C2,L,D ≥ mincut2−r.
Using a idea similar to [2, Section IV], we show C1,D ≤ mincut1−r. For this aim, we choose edges crossing a
line separating the source node and the terminal node such that these edges contains the r eavesdropped edges. Let
Z be the variable on the r eavesdropped edges, and Y be the variable on the above edges crossing the separating
line. Let M be the message to be securely transmitted. Due to the security condition, we have I(M ;Z) = 0 When
an edge has an information with cardinality d, the receiver’s information B satisfies
I(M ;B) ≤ I(M ;Y ) = I(M ;Y Z) = I(M ;Z) + I(M ;Y |Z) = I(M ;Y |Z) ≤ H(Y |Z) ≤ (mincut1−r) log d,
(28)
N. CAI AND M. HAYASHI: SECURE NETWORK CODE FOR ADAPTIVE AND ACTIVE ATTACKS 10
M+L1
1
2
5
L1
Alice
Bob3
4
L2
L2
M+L2
L1
Fig. 2. Network with equality in (27). Node 1 is the source node and Node 5 is the terminal node. Node 4 is a pseudo source node. Hence,
mincut2 = 1 and mincut1 = 2. It also shows a linear code to achieve mincut1−r when r = 1. The source node (Node 1) has the message
M and a scramble variable L1. The pseudo source node (Node 4) has another scramble variable L2. Even when Eve wiretaps any one edge,
she cannot obtain any information for the message M .
source terminate
e(1,1)
e(1,2)
e(1,k1)
e(2,1)
e(2,2)
e(2,k2)
e(l,1)
e(l,2)
e(l,kl)
Fig. 3. Unicast relay network.
which implies C1,D ≤ mincut1−r. Therefore, using (20) and (25) and combining these facts, we obtain (27).
When no intermediate node is allowed to generate randomness, any pseudo source node plays no role. Hence,
the above discussion yields that C2,D ≤ mincut2−r. Thus, we obtain (26).
Example 2. Next, we consider the case when A0 is given by using the following group structure of the intermediate
nodes. The intermediate nodes are divided into c − 1 groups, from the first group to the c − 1-th group. Here, a
source nodes and b terminal nodes are regarded as the 0-th group and the c-th group, respectively. For i = 1, . . . , c,
there are several edges between the i− 1-th group and the i-th group. We call the set of these edges the i-th edge
group. As seen later, this grouping of edges is essential to define the collection A0. Each intermediate node has
incoming edges and outgoing edges.
Eve is assumed to eavesdrop a part of edges from the i-th edge group. Eve’s ability is characterized by the
collection of subsets of the i-th edge group to be eavesdropped, which is called the i-th tapped-edge collection and
is denoted by Si. When an intermediate node of i-th group is directly linked to an intermediate node of i + 2-th
group, we consider that the intermediate node of i-th group is connected to intermediate node of i + 1-th group
with an edge that is not contained in any member of the i + 1-th tapped-edge collection Si+1. Similarly, when
an intermediate node of i-th group is directly linked to an intermediate node of i+ i′-th group, we can apply the
same reduction. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that an outgoing edge of an intermediate node
of i-th group is linked only to an intermediate node of i + 1-th group. Hence, the collection A0 is given to be
S1 × S2 × · · · × Sc.
V. RELAY NETWORK
A. Formulation and capacities
Now, as a special case of Example 2, we consider the relay network given in Fig. 3 as a generalization of the
network of Fig 1. This network is a unicast network, and only one intermediate node in each intermediate group.
That is, it has c−1 intermediate nodes. We have ki edges between the i−1 and i-th nodes. In one channel use, each
edge e(i, j) can transmit the information Yi,j for i = 1, . . . , c and j = 1, . . . , ki that takes values on {1, . . . , d}.
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Here, we assume that Eve can eavesdrop ri edges ~Yi,si := (Yi,si(1), . . . , Yi,si(ri)) among ki edges Y i :=
(Yi,j)j=1,...,ki between the i− 1 and i-th nodes. In this notation, the function si expresses the edges eavesdropped
by Eve. That is, she can eavesdrop
∑c
i=1 ri edges totally. In this paper, we allow stronger attacks for Eve than
conventional attacks, i.e., adaptive attacks and active attacks.
Then, we have the following capacity theorem.
Theorem 3. Defining
h1 := k1, h
j := min(kj ,
kj−1 − rj−1
kj−1
hj−1 + γj), (29)
we have
C1 = C1,L = C1,D = C1,L,D = C1,AC = C1,L,AC = log d min
1≤j≤c
(kj − rj), (30)
C2 = C2,L = C2,D = C2,L,D = C2,AC = C2,L,AC = log d min
1≤j≤c
(kj − rj)(kj+1 − rj+1) · · · (kc − rc)
kj+1 · · · kc , (31)
C[(γi)i] = C[(γi)i]L = C[(γi)i]D = C[(γi)i]L,D = C[(γi)i]AC = C[(γi)i]L,AC = log d min
1≤j≤c
kj − rj
kj
hj . (32)

Here, we discuss the relation to existing results with respect to the difference between two capacities C1 and C2.
A larger part of studies discuss the capacity (or capacity region) with no restriction of randomness generated in
intermediate nodes. For example, in r-wiretap network, which is a typical network model, as explained in Example
1, the capacity with no restriction can be achieved without use of randomness generated in intermediate nodes.
However, the paper [23] showed an example, in which randomness generated in intermediate nodes improves the
capacity. In this example, the source node is connected only with one edge. Usually, the secure transmission can
be done by use of the difference between information on different edges connected to the same node. Hence, it is
natural that randomness generated in intermediate nodes improves the capacity when each source node is connected
only to one edge.
The papers [24], [25] addressed the difference between the existence and non-existence of randomness generated
in intermediate nodes in another network only for deterministic attacks. However, they did not derive the capacities
C1,D and C2,D exactly. Their analysis depends on special codes. Therefore, our analysis is the first derivation of
the difference between the capacities C1,D and C2,D except for the case when the source node is connected only
with one edge.
B. Converse part
For any j = 1, . . . , c, the rate of secure transmission from the j−1-th intermediate node to the j-th intermediate
node is log d(kj − rj). Taking the minimum with respect to j, we obtain C1,D ≤ log dmin1≤j≤c(kj − rj).
Next, we consider (31). For the amount of leaked information, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Under the condition (C2), we have
max
s1,...,sc
I(M ; ~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yc,sc)
≥H(M)− (log d) min
1≤j≤c
(kj − rj)(kj+1 − rj+1) · · · (kc − rc)
kj+1 · · · kc . (33)

Therefore, to realize the condition
max
s1,...,sc
I(M ; ~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yc,sc) = 0, (34)
the message M needs to satisfy the condition
H(M) ≤ log d min
1≤j≤c
(kj − rj)(kj+1 − rj+1) · · · (kc − rc)
kj+1 · · · kc . (35)
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When use the same network n times, the condition (34) requires the condition
H(M) ≤ n log d min
1≤j≤c
(kj − rj)(kj+1 − rj+1) · · · (kc − rc)
kj+1 · · · kc , (36)
which implies C2,D ≤ log dmin1≤j≤c(kj − rj) (kj+1−rj+1)···(kc−rc)kj+1···kc .
Theorem 4 can be generalized to the limited randomness case as follows. Hence, it is sufficient to show Theorem
5.
Theorem 5. Under the condition (C2’), we have
max
s1,...,sc
I(M ; ~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yc,sc)
≥H(M)− log d min
1≤j≤c
kj − rj
kj
hj . (37)

Proof of Theorem 5: Now, we independently choose the sets S1, S2, . . . , Sc subject to the uniform distribution.
We denote the expectation is with respect to this random choice by E. We prove Theorem 5 by using Lemma 4,
which will be shown in the latter section. Application of Lemma 4 to X = (~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) shows the
inequality
EH(~Yj,Sj |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) ≥
rj
kj
EH(Y j |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) (38)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ c. Then we have for 1 ≤ j ≤ c,
EH(M |~Yc,Sc , ~Yc−1,Sc−1 . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
≤EH(M |~Yj,Sj , ~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
(a)
≤EH(Y j |~Yj,Sj , ~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
=EH(~Yj,Scj |~Yj,Sj , ~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
=EH(Y j |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)− EH(~Yj,Sj |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
(b)
≤ kj − rj
kj
EH(Y j |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1), (39)
where (b) follows from (38), and (a) follows from the fact that M is determined by the random variable Y j .
Similarly, we have
EH(Y j |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , ~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
(a)
≤EH(Y j−1,Kj |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , ~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
=EH(~Yj−1,Scj−1 ,Kj |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , ~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
≤EH(~Yj−1,Scj−1 |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , ~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) + γj log d
=EH(Y j−1|~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)− EH(~Yj−1,Sj−1 |~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) + γj log d
(b)
≤ kj−1 − rj−1
kj−1
EH(Y j−1|~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) + γj log d, (40)
where (a) follows from the fact that Y j is determined by the random variables Y j−1,Kj , and (b) follows from
(38).
Now, we show
EH(Y j |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) ≤ hj log d (41)
by induction with respect to j. Since H(Y 1) ≤ k1, (41) holds for j = 1. Assume that
EH(Y j−1|~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) ≤ hj−1 log d.
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Then (40) implies that
EH(Y j |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1)
=
kj−1 − rj−1
kj−1
EH(Y j−1|~Yj−2,Sj−2 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) + γj log d
≤kj−1 − rj−1
kj−1
hj−1 log d+ γj log d, (42)
Also, we have
EH(Y j |~Yj−1,Sj−1 , . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) ≤ H(Y j) ≤ kj log d. (43)
Combining (42) and (43), we have (41).
Therefore, combining (39) and (41), we have
EH(M |~Yc,Sc , ~Yc−1,Sc−1 . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) ≤
kj − rj
kj
hj log d, (44)
which is equivalent to
EI(M ; ~Yc,Sc , ~Yc−1,Sc−1 . . . , ~Y2,S2 , ~Y1,S1) ≥ H(M)−
kj − rj
kj
hj log d. (45)
Hence, we obtain the desired statement.
C. Code construction to achieve capacity C1,L,D
We give a code to achieve the capacity C1,L,D. For simplicity, we assume that the integer d is a power q of a
prime p. The general case will be discussed later. When we can make the desired code in the case with c = 1,
we can employ the constructed code for the secure transmission code from the i − 1-th intermediate node to the
i-th intermediate node because the i− 1-th intermediate node can employ scramble random numbers Ti−1. For this
purpose, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any prime power q, any two natural numbers k > r, there exist a natural integer nk,r and r vectors
v1, . . . , vr ∈ Fkqnk,r such that vi,j = δi,j for j = 1, . . . ,m and the r × r matrix (vi,s(j))i,j is invertible for any
injective function t from {1, . . . , r} to {1, . . . , k}. 
This lemma might be shown in the context of the wiretap channel II introduced by Ozarow and Wyner [29]. In
the model of wiretap channel II, a secrete message is encoded to a codeword in an nk,r-length code. A wiretapper
may take any r components out of k parallel channels but may have no information about the message. A linear
code, e.g., a Reed-Solomon code can serve as the code. It is called a (k, r) code for wiretap channel II, and satisfies
the condition for Lemma 2. Also, this leamma also can be regarded as a very simple and special case of the code
in [2, Section III]. For readers’ convenience, we give its proof in Appendix A.
Here, we make the desired code in the case with c = 1. We employ the finite filed Fq′ with q′ = qnk,r . That is,
we need finite field of large size, whose efficient construction is discussed in [32, Appendix D]. So, when we use
the channel n := n′nk,r times, our transmission can be regarded as n′ times transmission on Fq′ , i.e., each edge
can transmit up to n′ symbols in Fq′ . In the following, all random variables are treated as random variables taking
values in Fq′ .
According to Lemma 2, we choose r vectors v1, . . . , vr ∈ Fkqnk,r . Using r additional scramble random numbers
L1, . . . , Lr, we can transmit k − r random variables M1, . . . ,Mk−r by encoding the random variable ~Yj for the
j-th edge by
Yj :=
{
Lj when j ≤ r
Mj−r +
∑r
j′=1 vj′,jLj′ when r + 1 < j ≤ k. (46)
Then, Bob recovers the original messages M1, . . . ,Mk−r as
M ′j := Yj+r −
r∑
j′=1
vj′,jYj′ . (47)
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Assume that Eve eavesdrops r edges, the s(1)-th edge, . . ., the s(r)-th edge. Due to the condition in Lemma 2,
for any function s, the vectors (vj′,s(1))1≤j′≤r, . . . , (vj′,s(r))1≤j′≤r are linearly independent. So,
∑r
j′=1 vj′,s(1)Lj′ ,
. . . ,
∑r
j′=1 vj′,s(r)Lj′ are r uniform random numbers even when we fixed the values of the random variables
M1, . . . ,Mk−r. Eve cannot obtain any information for M1, . . . ,Mk−r.
Repeating n′ times this procedure, we can extend this method to the case when we transmit (k − r)n′ random
variables M1, . . . ,M(k−r)n′ with rn′ additional scramble random numbers L1, . . . , Lrn′ . Therefore, the transmission
rate of this code is (k−r) log2 q
′
nk,r
= (k−r) log q. Since (M1, . . . ,M(k−r)n′) can be regarded as an element of a vector
space over Fq′ , this operation is a linear code with respect to the finite field Fq′ . Therefore, since it satisfies the
linearity condition (C1), the above security analysis over the deterministic attack guarantees the security over the
adaptive and active attack due to Theorem 24.
Here, we make the desired code in the case with general c. Based on Lemma 2 with respective ki and ri,
we choose nki,ri . Then, we choose the finite filed Fq′ with q′ = qmax1≤i≤c nki,ri . Therefore, we can transmit the
minimum rate log qmin1≤j≤c(kj− rj). In this construction, the transmission on each step is given by a linear code
over the finite field Fq′ , the whole operation is also given as a linear code over the finite field Fq′ . Therefore, since
it satisfies the linearity condition (C1), Theorem 2 guarantees the security over the adaptive and active attack.
Now, we consider the case that the integer d is not a power q of a prime p. In this case, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.
lim
n→∞
1
n
log max
q: prime power
{log q|q ≤ dn} = log d. (48)

Given a sufficiently large integer n, we choose a prime power q := argmaxq: prime power{log q|q ≤ dn}. We
treat n uses of a channel as a single transmission of random variable taking values in Fq. Due to Lemma 3, the
code given above achieves the transmission rates log dmin1≤j≤c(kj − rj) when n goes to infinity.
D. Code construction to achieve capacity C[(γi)i]L,D and C2,L,D
Since the capacity C2,L,D is a special case of C[(γi)i]L,D with γi = 0, we construct only a code to achieve the
capacity C[(γi)i]L,D. Similar to the previous section, we choose the finite filed Fq′ with q′ = qmax1≤i≤c nki,ri , and
we consider the case of n := n′max1≤i≤c nki,ri uses of the channel, i.e., each edge can transmit up to n′ symbols
in Fq′ . In the following, all random variables are treated as random variables taking values in Fq′ . For notational
simplicity, we consider the case when single use of each edge transmits an element of Fq′ .
To achieve the above purpose, we give a linear code with respect to Fq′ satisfying the following two conditions
(D1) and (D2) by induction with respect to j. Since the code satisfies the linearity condition (C1), it is sufficient
to consider the deterministic attack.
(D1) The code securely transmits the message M of hj symbols per single use of channel to the j-th node
from the source node, where hj := min1≤j′≤j
kj′−rj′
kj′
hj
′
. That is, I(M ; ~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yj,sj ) = 0 for any
(s1, . . . , sj) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sj .
(D2) The j-th node receives secure random number T ′j of h
j − hj symbols per single use of channel, which
contains the random numbers generated from the 1st node to the j − 1-th node, where hj := kj−rjkj hj .
That is, the j-th node receives secure random number of h
j
symbols per single use of channel, i.e.,
I(MT ′j ; ~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yj,sj ) = 0 for any (s1, . . . , sj) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sj .
Since h
1
= h1 = (k1 − r1), the desired code with j = 1 was constructed in Subsection V-C. We show the
existence of the desired linear code with respect to Fq′ by induction. That is, we assume the existence in the
case of j − 1 with block length nj−1. We find that hj = min((kj − rj), kj−rjkj (h
j−1
+ γj)) and hj = min((kj −
rj),
kj−rj
kj
(h
j−1
+ γj), h
j−1) for j ≥ 2. We show the existence of such a code with j by classifying three cases.
4 Theorem 2 can be applied to a linear code with respect to any finite field. Hence, we do not need to restrict our discussion to linear
codes with respect to the finite field Fq .
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(1) Case of hj = h
j
= (kj − rj): To achieve the desired task, the j − 1-th node needs to securely transmit the
message M of (kj−rj) symbols per single use of channel to the j-th node, which requires scramble random numbers
T ′j of rj symbols per single use of channel at the j−1-th node. Since rj ≤ h
j−1
+γj−(kj−rj), the j−1-th node has
sufficient scramble random numbers for this purpose. We divide the scramble random numbers T ′j into two parts T
′
j,1
and T ′j,2, where T
′
j,1 has γj symbols per single of channel and T
′
j,2 has (rj−γj) symbols per single of channel. Due to
the assumption of induction, the sender securely transmits M and T ′j,2 to the j−1-th node by a linear code with block
length nj−1, where the first nj−1(kj−rj) symbols are M , the next nj−1(rj−γj) symbols are T ′j,2, and the remaining
symbols are fixed to zero. That is, I(MT ′j,2; ~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yj−1,sj−1) = 0 for any (s1, . . . , sj−1) ∈ S1×· · ·×Sj−1. We
choose block length nj to be nj−1. Since T ′j,1 is composed of nj−1γj symbols and is independent of other random
variables, We apply the code given in Subsection V-C with n′ = nj−1 to the message M and the scramble random
number T ′j . Then, the j−1-th node securely transmits the message M to the j-th node by a desired linear code with
respect to Fq′ of block length nj . Therefore, I(M ; ~Yj,sj |~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yj−1,sj−1) = 0 for any (j1, . . . , sj) ∈ S1×· · ·×Sj .
Hence, I(M ; ~Y1,s1 , . . . , ~Yj,sj ) = 0 for any (j1, . . . , sj) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sj .
(2) Case of hj = h
j
= kj−rjkj (h
j−1
+γj): To achieve the desired task, the j−1-th node needs to securely transmit
the message M of hj = h
j
symbols per single use of channel to the j-th node, which requires scramble random
numbers T ′j of
kj−rj
kj
h
j
symbols per single use of channel at the j−1-th node. Since kj−rjkj h
j
= rjkj−rj
kj−rj
kj
(h
j−1
+
γj) = h
j−1
+ γj − kj−rjkj (h
j−1
+ γj), the j − 1-th node has sufficient scramble random numbers for the above
purpose. Therefore, similar to the case (1), we can show the existence of the desired linear code with respect to
Fq′ .
(3) Case of hj = hj−1 < hj : Since hj is kj − rj or kj−rjkj (h
j−1
+ γj), due to the discussion with the above two
cases (1) and (2), the j-th node receives secure random number of h
j
symbols per single use of channel. To achieve
the desired task, the j − 1-th node needs to securely transmit the message M of hj(≤ kj − rj) symbols per single
use of channel to the j-th node, which requires scramble random numbers T ′j of
kj−rj
kj
hj symbols per single use of
channel at the j − 1-th node. Since rjkj−rj hj =
rj
kj−rj h
j−1 ≤ γj , the j − 1-th node has sufficient scramble random
numbers for this purpose. Therefore, similar to the case (1), we can show the existence of the desired linear code
with respect to Fq′ .
Therefore, there exists a code that transmits the message with the rate hc to the source node from the source
node.
Remark 2. We consider how many uses of the channel can achieve the capacity when d is a prime power q and
the intermediate node cannot use additional random number, i.e., γi = 0. To answer this problem, we consider
another proof in this special case. When we set n′ := k2 · · · kc and n := n′ · max1≤i≤c nki,ri , we can achieve
the capacity in the following way. That is, our transmission can be regarded as n′ times transmission on Fq′ , i.e.,
n′ ·max1≤i≤c nki,ri times transmission of the original channel.
In the following construction, we employ k1 · · · kc random variables. In this protocol, we securely transmit
(k1−r1) · · · (ki−ri)ki+1 · · · kc random variable to the i-th node. That is, in the transmission from the i−1-th node
to the i-th node, we transmit (k1− r1) · · · (ki−1− ri−1)riki+1 · · · kc random numbers, in which, (k1− r1) · · · (ki−
ri)ki+1 · · · kc random numbers are securely transmitted and the remaining (k1 − r1) · · · (ki−1 − ri−1)riki+1 · · · kc
random variables are treated as scramble random variables. Such a transmission is possible by applying the method
given Subsection V-C to the (k1 − r1) · · · (ki − ri)ki+1 · · · kc random variables, which are securely transmitted to
the i−1-th node. Using the above recursive construction, we can securely transmit ∏ci=1(ki−ri) random variables.
The single use of the channel between the i−1-th node and the i-th node can securely transmit (ki−ri) random
variables. So, to realize this code, we need to use the channel between the i − 1-th node and the i-th node at
(k1−r1)···(ki−ri)ki+1···kc
ki−ri = (k1 − r1) · · · (ki−1 − ri−1)ki+1 · · · kc times. That is, to realize this code, we need to use
this relay channel max1≤i≤c(k1 − r1) · · · (ki−1 − ri−1)ki+1 · · · kc times. Overall, this code can transmit
min
1≤i≤c
∏c
i=1(ki − ri)
(k1 − r1) · · · (ki−1 − ri−1)ki+1 · · · kc = min1≤j≤c(kj − rj)
(kj+1 − rj+1) · · · (kc − rc)
kj+1 · · · kc (49)
variables per single use of the relay channel. That is, the transmission rate of this code is log qmin1≤j≤c(kj −
rj)
(kj+1−rj+1)···(kc−rc)
kj+1···kc . Therefore, we can realize a code to satisfy the conditions (34) and (36) for the above given
n. 
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E. Scalar linearity
Now, we show that this capacity cannot be attained under the scalar linearity condition. That is, we consider
the special case to satisfy the following conditions. The intermediate node cannot use additional random number,
i.e., γi = 0. We can transmit only a single symbol of a finite filed Fq′ in each channel. The coding operations are
limited to linear operations over the finite filed Fq′ . Since each channel can send only a scalar in Fq′ , this kind of
linearity is called the scalar linearity[26]. To distinguish the condition (C1) from the scalar linearity, the condition
(C1) is often called the vector linearity[26]. Existing studies employ one of these constraints as Table I. Only a
deterministic attack is allowed to the eavesdropper. Under the above condition, the number of symbols transmitted
securely is not greater than max(k1 −
∑c
j=1 rj , 0), which can be shown as follows.
Due to the network structure, the sender can transmit only k symbols M1, . . . ,Mk in Fq′ , where the k symbols
M1, . . . ,Mk is given as linear functions of the message and the scramble random variable. First, we fix the linear
coding operation on each nodes. In the first group of edges, Eve chooses r1 edges such that the information on the
r1 edges are given as
∑r1
i=1 t1,i′,iMi with i
′ = 1, . . . , r1 and {~t1,i′} is linearly independent, where ~t1,i′ = (t1,i′,i)ki=1
for i′ = 1, . . . , r1. Similarly, when k1 ≥ r1 + r2, in the second group of edges, Eve chooses r2 edges such that
the information on the r2 edges are given as
∑r2
i=1 t2,i′,iMi with i
′ = 1, . . . , r1 and {~t1,i′} ∪ {~t2,i′} is linearly
independent, where ~t2,i′ = (t2,i′,i)ki=1 for i
′ = 1, . . . , r2. When k1 < r1 + r2, in the second group of edges, Eve
chooses k1−r1 edges such that the information on the k1−r1 edges are given as
∑k1−r1
i=1 t2,i′,iMi with i
′ = 1, . . . , r1
and {~t1,i′}∪{~t2,i′} is linearly independent, where ~t2,i′ = (t2,i′,i)ki=1 for i′ = 1, . . . , k1− r1. When k1 > r1 + r2, we
repeat this process up to the c-th group or j′-th group satisfying k1 −
∑j′
j=1 rj ≤ 0. Hence, the information with
dimension max(k1,
∑c
j=1 rj) is leaked to the eavesdropper. Therefore, the number of symbols transmitted securely
is not greater than max(k1 −
∑c
j=1 rj , 0).
This fact shows the following effect. To achieve the capacity even with deterministic attacks, each channel needs
to transmit several symbols in the finite field Fq′ . That is, we need to handle the vector space over the finite field
Fq′ . Furthermore, as a special case, in the setting given in Section III, we find that we need to introduce a non-linear
code to realize the situation that Eve cannot recover the message perfectly with deterministic attack.
We often increase the size q′ of finite field Fq′ in the scalar linearity while we fix the size q of finite field Fq
and increase the dimension of the vector space in the vector linearity. In the real communication, the data is given
as a sequence of F2. In this case, when q = 2, the coding operation satisfying the vector linearity can be easily
implemented because the vector linearity reflects the structure of the data. However, the coding operation satisfying
the scalar linearity cannot be easily implemented unless q′ is a power of 2 because the scalar linearity does not
reflect the structure of the data. Only when q′ is a power of 2, the scalar linearity not be easily implemented.
However, even in this case, the scalar linearity has worse performance than the vector linearity due to the above
discussion because the scalar linearity introduces a constraint that does not appear in the vector linearity. Hence, it
is better to impose the vector linearity.
VI. IMPORTANT LEMMAS
Here, for the latter discussion, we prepare important lemmas. We denote the set {1, . . . , k} by [k], and denote
the collection of subsets S ⊂ [k] with cardinality r by ([k]r ).
Now, we consider the random variables X, ~Y1, . . . , ~Yk. For any subset S ⊂ [k], we denote the tuple of random
variables (~Ys)s∈S by ~YS . We can show the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4. We have ∑
S∈([k]r )
H(~Y[k]|~YScX) ≤
(
k − 1
r − 1
)
H(~Y[k]|X) =
k − r
k
(
k
k − r
)
H(~Y[k]|X) (50)

Remark 3. It is possible to prove Lemma 4 by using Baranyai’s Theorem [33]. However, this paper shows Lemma
4 by using our invented lemma, Lemma 5. 
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Lemma 5. Let Sh be a collection of subsets of [k]. When any element of [k] is contained in exactly h members of
Sh, we have ∑
S∈Sh
H(~YS |X) ≥ hH(~Y[k]|X). (51)

Proof of Lemma 5: We prove the lemma by induction in h. When h = 1, it is trivial. Assume that the
lemma holds for h − 1. We pick a subcollection S ′ := {S1, S2, . . . , Sf} ⊂ Sh such that ∪fi=1Si = [k]. We define
S′i := Si ∩ (∪i−1j=1Sj) and Sh−1 = (Sh \ S ′) ∪ {S′2, . . . , S′f}.
We can see that any element of [k] is contained in exactly h − 1 members of Sh−1, from the following lines.
Assume that an element a ∈ [k] is contained in exactly b members of S ′. Notice that a is contained by Si, for
each particular i, if and only if it is contained by exactly one of Si \ [∪i−1j=1Sj ] and S′i. For any element a ∈ [k],
there uniquely exists an integer i such that a ∈ Si \ [∪i−1j=1Sj ]. So, the element a is contained in exactly b − 1
members of {S′2, . . . , S′f}. Therefore, the element a is contained in exactly h − b + (b − 1) = h − 1 members of
Sh−1 = (Sh \ S ′) ∪ {S′2, . . . , S′f}.
Therefore, ∑
S∈Sh
H(~YS |X) =
∑
S∈Sh\S′
H(~YS |X) +
f∑
i=1
H(~YSi |X)
=
∑
S∈Sh\S′
H(~YS |X) +
f∑
i=1
H(~YS′i |X) +
f∑
i=1
H(~YSi\S′i |~YS′iX)
(a)
≥
∑
S∈Sh−1
H(~YS |X) +
f∑
i=1
H(~YSi\(∪i−1j=1Sj)|~Y∪i−1j=1SjX)
(b)
≥(h− 1)H(~Y[k]|X) +H(~Y[k]|X) = hH(~Y[k]|X), (52)
where (a) follows from the relation S′i ⊂ ∪i−1j=1Sj and (b) follows from the relation ∪fi=1Si = [k] and the induction
hypothesis, the fact that
∑
S∈Sh−1 H(
~YS |X) ≥ (h− 1)H(~Y[k]|X).
Proof of Lemma 4: Now, we show Lemma 4 by using Lemma 5. Any element a ∈ [k] is contained in exactly(
k−1
r−1
)
members of
(
[k]
r
)
. So, we apply Lemma 5 to the case with Sh =
(
[k]
r
)
and h =
(
k−1
r−1
)
. Hence, we have∑
S∈([k]r )
H(~YSc |X) ≤
(
k − 1
r − 1
)
H(~Y[k]|X). (53)
Thus, ∑
S∈([k]r )
H(~Y[k]|~YScX) =
∑
S∈([k]r )
H(~YSc ~YS |~YScX) =
∑
S∈([k]r )
H(~YS |~YScX)
=
∑
S∈([k]r )
[H(~YS ~YSc |X)−H(~YSc |X)]
=
(
k
m
)
H(~Y[k]|X)−
∑
S∈([k]r )
H(~YSc |X)
≤
(
k
r
)
H(~Y[k]|X)−
(
k − 1
r − 1
)
H(~Y[k]|X) =
(
k
r − 1
)
H(~Y[k]|X). (54)
N. CAI AND M. HAYASHI: SECURE NETWORK CODE FOR ADAPTIVE AND ACTIVE ATTACKS 18
source
(1,1)n
1st group
⋮
(1,2)n
1(1, )n b
(2,1)n
⋮
(2,2)n
2(2, )n b
( ,1)n c
⋮
( , 2)n c
( , )cn c b
2nd group c-th group
(terminated)
Fig. 4. homogeneous multicast relay network
VII. HOMOGENEOUS MULTICAST RELAY NETWORK
A. Formulation and capacity regions
Next, as a special case of Example 2, we consider the homogeneous multicast relay network defined as follows.
This network has one source node and b terminal nodes. It has c− 1 groups of intermediate nodes. The i-th group
has bi intermediate nodes, and the set of b terminal nodes is regarded as the c-th group, and the source node is
regarded as the 0-th group. So, the numbers b0 and bc are defined to be 1 and b. Each node of the i-the group is
expressed as n(i, 1), . . . , n(i, bi).
Each node of the i − 1-th group is connected to every node of the i-th group with ki edges. That is, there are
bi−1biki edges from the i−1-th group to the i-th group. For each node of the i-th group, Eve is assumed to wiretap
ri edges among bi−1ki edges connected to the node of the i-th group from nodes of the i − 1-th group. That is,
Eve wiretaps ribi edges among bi−1biki edges between the i− 1-th group and the i-th group.
Then, we have the following theorem for the no-randomness capacity region.
Theorem 6.
C2 = C2,L = C2,D = C2,L,D = C2,AC = C2,L,AC =
{
(R1, . . . , Rb)
∣∣∣∣ b∑
i′=1
Ri′ ≤ A1, Ri ≤ A2 for i = 1, . . . , b
}
(55)
where
A1 := (log d) min
1≤j≤c
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−1kc (56)
A2 := (log d)(bc−1kc − rc). (57)

For the full-randomness capacity region, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 7. Assume that c = 2 and r2/k2 is an integer. Then, we have
C1 = C1,L = C2 = C2,L = C1,D = C1,L,D = C2,D = C2,L,D = C1,AC = C1,L,AC = C2,AC = C2,L,AC . (58)

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Theorem 8. Assume that c = 3 and r3/k3 is an integer.
C1 = C1,L = C1,D = C1,L,D = C1,AC = C1,L,AC =
{
(R1, . . . , Rb)
∣∣∣∣ b∑
i′=1
Ri′ ≤ A3, Ri ≤ A2 for i = 1, . . . , b
}
, (59)
where
A3 := (log d) min
(
(k1 − r1)b1, min
2≤j≤3
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−1kc
)
= (log d) min
(
(k1 − r1)b1, (b1k2 − r2)b2 b2k3 − r3
b2k3
, (b2k3 − r3)b3
)
. (60)

B. Converse part for Theorem 6
We consider the j-th group as one intermediate node, and the set of the b terminal nodes as one terminal node,
which yields a relay network. Then, applying the relation (36) to this relay network, we obtain the condition∑b
i′=1Ri′ ≤ A1.
Next, we consider the j-th group as one intermediate node, and focus only on the i-th terminal nodes, which
yields another relay network. Then, applying the relation (36) to this relay network, we obtain the other condition
Ri ≤ A2.
C. Code construction for Theorem 6
Here, by induction, we make a linear code to achieve the RHS of (59) when d is a prime power q. In the general
case, we can construct the desired linear code by using the method in Lemma 3. The liner code construction with
c = 1 is given from the code given in Subsection V-C. We construct the desired linear code by induction with
respect to the number c.
Assume that n is a multiple of nkcn,rc . Now, we assume that the source node can securely transmit
∑b
i′=1Ni′
letters to each intermediate node in the c − 1-th group by n use of the channel. When Ni′ ≤ nkc, under this
assumption, we can transmit Ni′bc−1 − nrc letters from the source node to the i′-th terminal node by n use of the
channel as follows. Such a code will be called Code (N1, . . . , Nb).
For j2 = 1, . . . , b, j1 = 1, . . . , kc, we denote the
∑j2−1
i′=1 Ni′+j1-th securely transmitted letter to j-th intermediate
node in the c − 1-th group by Xj2,j1+jNi′ . Then, for a given j2 = 1, . . . , b, the source node prepares messages
Mj2,j3 for j3 = 1, . . . , Nj2bc−1 − nrc and scramble random numbers Lj2,j3 for j3 = 1, . . . , nrc. Then, the source
node makes conversion from the pair of ~Mj2 and ~Lj2 to ~Xj2 such that there is no information leakage for ~Mj2
even when any nrc letters of ~Xj2 are eavesdropped. Such a code can be constructed by using the discussion in
Subsection V-C.
Now, we employ the assumption of induction. So, there exist an integer n and a code Φn with block-length n
such that the rate tuple is ( A4bc−1 , . . . ,
A4
bc−1
), where
A4 := min
1≤j≤c−1
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−2kc−1 − rc−1)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−2kc−1 . (61)
Using this fact, we show the desired statement by classifying two cases.
(1) Case of A4bc−1 ≥ kcbc: In this case, the minimum in (56) is realized with j = c, which implies A1 = bcA2.
To attain the RHS of (59), it is sufficient to give a code with the rate tuple (A2, . . . , A2) = (log d(bc−1kc −
rc), . . . , log d(bc−1kc−rc)). The required secure transmission from the source node to the c−1-th group is possible
as follows. Combining the assumption of induction and Code (nkc, . . . , nkc). we obtain a linear code with the rate
tuple (log d(bc−1kc − rc), . . . , log d(bc−1kc − rc)).
(2) Case of A4bc−1 < kcbc: We have A1 = A4
bc−1kc−rc
bc−1kc
. To attain the RHS of (59), it is sufficient to give a code
with the rate tuple (R1, . . . , Rb) satisfying conditions
∑b
i′=1Ri′ ≤ A1 and Ri ≤ A2. Due to the assumption of
induction, the source node can securely transmit n A4bc−1 letters to each node in the c− 1-th group. Now, we choose
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n such that n A4bc−1b is an integer, n is a multiple of nkcn,rc , and nRi′ is integer for i
′ = 1, . . . , b. Therefore, using
Code (nR1, . . . , nRb), we obtain a linear code, in which, the source node can securely transmit to the i′-th terminal
with rate Ri′ . Since this linear code construction requires only the conditions
∑b
i′=1Ri′ ≤ A1 and Ri ≤ A2, the
RHS of (59) is attained.
D. Proof of Theorem 7
To show Theorem 7, it is sufficient to show the converse part, i.e., C1,D ⊂ C2,D. The i-th intermediate node
can transmit information of k2 symbols per single use of channel to the j-th terminal node. In order that the j-th
terminal node recovers the original message Mj , the j-th terminal node needs to recover a part of information
Mi,j with respect to the original message that is determined by the information received by the i-th intermediate
node. That is, collecting the variables M1,j , . . . ,Mb1,j , the j-th terminal node recovers Mj . We choose an injective
function s from {1, . . . , r2/k2} to {1, . . . , b2}. Now, we consider the case that Eve wiretaps all the channels from the
s(i)-th intermediate node to the j-th terminal node for i = 1, . . . , r2/k2. When the s(i)-th terminal node introduces
scramble random variables Ls(i),j in the channel to the j-th terminal node, the j-th terminal node needs to recover
Ms(i),j . In this case, Eve also recovers Ms(i),j . Then, there is no merit to introduce the scramble random variables
Ls(i),j in this channel. When the i′-th terminal node introduces scramble random variables Li′,j in the channel to
the j-th terminal node for i′ ∈ {1, . . . , b2} \ {s(1), . . . , s(r2/k2)}, the j-th terminal node needs to recover Mi′,j . In
this case, Eve has no access to this channel. Hence, there is no need to introduce the scramble random variables
Li′,j in this channel. Therefore, considering this special case, there is no advantage to introduce scramble random
variables in the intermediate nodes. That is, any code can be reduced to a code with the no-randomness condition
(C2).
E. Proof of Theorem 8
Due to the discussion in Subsection VII-D, the scramble random number introduced in intermediate nodes in the
2nd group does not work. Hence, we obtain the converse part, i.e., CD ⊂
{
(R1, . . . , Rb)
∣∣∣∣∑bi′=1Ri′ ≤ A3, Ri ≤
A2 for i = 1, . . . , b
}
.
Next, we construct a code to achieve the capacity region. Each intermediate node in the first group can securely
transmit to each terminal node with the following capacity region:{
(R1, . . . , Rb)
∣∣∣∣ b∑
i′=1
Ri′ ≤ A5
b1
, Ri ≤ A2
b1
for i = 1, . . . , b
}
(62)
with
A5 := (log d) min
(
(b1k2 − r2)b2 b2k3 − r3
b2k3
, (b2k3 − r3)b3
)
. (63)
Now, the source node can securely transmit information to each intermediate node in the first group with the rate
(log d)(k1 − r1). Combining these discussions, the source node can securely transmit information to each terminal
node via a specific intermediate node in the first group with the following capacity region:{
(R1, . . . , Rb)
∣∣∣∣ b∑
i′=1
Ri′ ≤ A3
b1
, Ri ≤ A2
b1
for i = 1, . . . , b
}
(64)
because A3 = min((log d)(k1 − r1)b1, A5). Summing up the above region with respect to intermediate nodes in
the first group, we find the relation CD,L ⊃
{
(R1, . . . , Rb)
∣∣∣∣∑bi′=1Ri′ ≤ A3, Ri ≤ A2 for i = 1, . . . , b}, which is
the direct part.
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Fig. 5. homogeneous multiple multicast relay network
VIII. HOMOGENEOUS MULTIPLE MULTICAST RELAY NETWORK
A. Formulation and capacity regions
Next, as a special case of Example 2, we consider the homogeneous multiple multicast relay network defined
as follows. This network has a source nodes and b terminal nodes. It has c− 1 groups of intermediate nodes. The
i-th group has bi intermediate nodes, and the set of b terminal nodes is regarded as the c-th group, and the source
node is regarded as the 0-th group. So, the numbers b0 and bc are defined to be a and b. Each node of the i-the
group is expressed as n(i, 1), . . . , n(i, bi).
Each source code is connected to each intermediate node in the first group with k1 edges. For i ≥ 2, each node
of the i− 1-th group is connected to every node of the i-th group with ki edges. That is, there are bi−1biki edges
from the i − 1-th group to the i-th group. For each node of the i-th group, Eve is assumed to wiretap r1 edges
among k1 edges between each source node and each intermediate node in the first group. Totally, Eve wiretaps
ab1r1 edges among ab1k1 edges between the 0-th group and the first group. For i ≥ 2, Eve is assumed to wiretap
ri edges among bi−1ki edges connected to the node of the i-th group from nodes of the i − 1-th group. That is,
Eve wiretaps ribi edges among bi−1biki edges between the i− 1-th group and the i-th group.
Then, we have the following theorem for the no-randomness capacity region.
Theorem 9.
C2 = C2,L = C2,D = C2,L,D = C2,AC = C2,L,AC
=
{
(Ri,j)1≤i≤a,1≤j≤b
∣∣∣∣∑
i′,j′
Ri′,j′ ≤ B1,
∑
j′
Ri,j′ ≤ B2,
∑
i′
Ri′,j ≤ B3 for i = 1, . . . , a, j = 1, . . . , b
}
, (65)
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where
B1 :=(log d) min
(
a(k1 − r1)b1 (b1k2 − r2) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
b1k2 · · · bc−1kc ,
min
2≤j≤c
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−1kc
)
(66)
B2 :=(log d) min
(
(k1 − r1)b1 (b1k2 − r2) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
b1k2 · · · bc−1kc ,
min
2≤j≤c
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−1kc
)
(67)
B3 :=(log d)(bc−1kc − rc). (68)

For the full-randomness capacity region, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 10. Assume that c = 2 and r2/k2 is an integer. Then, we have
C1 = C1,L = C2 = C2,L = C1,D = C1,L,D = C2,D = C2,L,D = C1,AC = C1,L,AC = C2,AC = C2,L,AC . (69)

Theorem 11. Assume that c = 3 and r3/k3 is an integer.
C1 = C1,L = C1,D = C1,L,D = C1,AC = C1,L,AC
=
{
(Ri,j)1≤i≤a,1≤j≤b
∣∣∣∣∑
i′,j′
Ri′,j′ ≤ B4,
∑
j′
Ri,j′ ≤ B5,
∑
i′
Ri′,j ≤ B3 for i = 1, . . . , a, j = 1, . . . , b
}
, (70)
where
B4 := (log d) min
(
a(k1 − r1)b1, min
2≤j≤3
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−1kc
)
= (log d) min
(
a(k1 − r1)b1, (b1k2 − r2)b2 b2k3 − r3
b2k3
, (b2k3 − r3)b3
)
(71)
B5 := (log d) min
(
(k1 − r1)b1, min
2≤j≤3
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−1kc − rc)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−1kc
)
= (log d) min
(
(k1 − r1)b1, (b1k2 − r2)b2 b2k3 − r3
b2k3
, (b2k3 − r3)b3
)
. (72)

B. Converse part for Theorem 9
We consider the j-th group as one intermediate node, and the set of the b terminal nodes and the set of the a
source nodes as one terminal node and one source node, respectively, which yields a relay network. Then, applying
the relation (36) to this relay network, we obtain the condition
∑b
i′,j′ Ri′,j′ ≤ B1.
Applying the discussion in Subsection VII-B to the network from the i-th source node to the j-th group, we
obtain the condition
∑b
j′ Ri,j′ ≤ B2. Similarly, applying the discussion in Subsection VII-B to the network from
the first group to the j-th terminal node, we obtain the condition
∑
i′ Ri′,j ≤ B3.
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C. Code construction for Theorem 9
Here, by induction, we make a code to achieve the RHS of (65) when d is a prime power q. In the general case,
we can construct the desired code by using the method in Lemma 3. The code construction with c = 1 is given
from the code given in Subsection V-C. We construct the desired code by induction with respect to the number c.
We choose a rate tuple (Ri,j)i,j satisfying the condition in the RHS of (65). As mentioned in the proof of Theorem
6, when we can securely transmit an unlimited number of messages from the source node to all of intermediate
nodes in the c − 1-th group, using the code with block-length n constructed in Subsection V-C, we can transmit
n(bc−1kc − rc) letters from the source node to each terminal node, in which, the source node securely transmits
nkc letters to each intermediate node in the c − 1-th group. Therefore, the rate tuple (Ri,j)i,j can be realized by
secure transmission with the rate R′i,j :=
bc−1kc
bc−1kc−rc
∑
j Ri,j from the i-th source node to the j-th intermediate
node in the c − 1-th group. The assumption of induction guarantees that the rate tuple (R′i,j)i,j is attainable in
the network from the first group to the c − 1-th group because the rate tuple (R′i,j)i,j satisfies the conditions∑
i′,j′ R
′
i′,j′ ≤ B′1,
∑
j′ R
′
i,j′ ≤ B′2,
∑
i′ R
′
i′,j ≤ B′3 for i = 1, . . . , a, j = 1, . . . , bc−1, where
B′1 :=(log d) min
1≤j≤c−1
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−2kc−1 − rc−1)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−2kc−1 (73)
B′2 :=(log d) min
(
(k1 − r1)b1 (b1k2 − r2) · · · (bc−2kc−1 − rc−1)
b1k2 · · · bc−2kc−1 ,
min
2≤j≤c−1
(bj−1kj − rj)bj (bjkj+1 − rj+1) · · · (bc−2kc−1 − rc−1)
bjkj+1 · · · bc−2kc−1
)
(74)
B′3 :=(log d)(bc−2kc−1 − rc−1). (75)
Therefore, the rate tuple (Ri,j)i,j is achievable.
D. Proof of Theorem 10
To show Theorem 7, it is sufficient to show the converse part C1 ⊂ C2. As shown in the proof of Theorem 7,
any code can be reduced to a code with the no-randomness condition (C2). Hence, we obtain C1 ⊂ C2.
E. Proof of Theorem 11
Similar to the proof of Theorem 8, the scramble random number introduced in intermediate nodes in the 2nd
group do not work. Hence, we obtain the converse part.
Next, we construct a code to achieve the capacity region. Each source node can securely transmit information to
each intermediate node in the first group with the rate (log d)(k1 − r1). Combining this code and the codes given
in (62) from each intermediate node in the first group to each terminal node, the set of source nodes can securely
transmit information to each terminal node via a specific intermediate node in the first group with the following
capacity region:{
(Ri,j)1≤i≤a,1≤j≤b
∣∣∣∣∑
i′,j′
Ri′,j′ ≤ B4
b1
,
∑
j′
Ri,j′ ≤ B5
b1
,
∑
i′
Ri′,j ≤ B3
b1
for i = 1, . . . , a, j = 1, . . . , b
}
(76)
because B3 = A3, B4 = min((log d)a(k1 − r1)b1, A5) and B5 = min((log d)(k1 − r1)b1, A5). Summing up the
above region with respect to intermediate nodes in the first group, we find that the rate region defined in the RHS
of (59).
IX. CONCLUSION
We have studied active and adaptive attacks, and have investigated whether an adaptive attack improves Eve’s
ability. As our result, we have shown that an adaptive attack improves Eve’s ability when our code is a linear code.
However, when our code is not a linear code, we have found an example where an adaptive attack improves Eve’s
ability in Section III. Any linear code cannot realize the performance of the non-linear code given there under the
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setting of Section III when Eve is allowed to a deterministic attack. Hence, the improvement by the adaptive attack
is essential in this setting.
Next, we consider several types of network, in which there is restriction for randomness in the intermediate nodes.
This kind of restriction is crucial in the secure network because randomness is required to realize the secrecy. In
the latter part of this paper, we have addressed various types of relay networks in the asymptotic setting, where we
employ liner codes, i.e., these codes are given as vector spaces over a finite field. In Section V, we have considered
a typical type of unicast relay network and have derived the capacity under various restrictions for randomness in
the intermediate nodes. To show the converse part, we have shown a notable lemma in Section VI. Our proof of the
direct part follows from a lemma related to wiretap channel II. Also, in Subsection V-E, we have shown that the
code does not work when it is given as a scalar of a finite field. Further, we have proceeded to more complicated
networks, e.g., a typical type of multicast relay network and a typical type of multiple multicast relay network.
Since their asymptotic performances are characterized as their capacity regions, in Sections VII and VIII, we have
derived them under the condition that the intermediate nodes have no scramble random number by generalizing the
method used in Section V.
While our asymptotic results are limited to special networks, the minimum cut theorem does not work in these
networks. Hence, our codes suggest a general theory for networks whose capacity cannot be shown by the minimum
cut theorem. It is an interesting future study to establish such a theory. As explained in Section I, when the spaces
of the intermediate nodes and/or the budget are limited, it might be better to avoid to equip scramble random
variables in the intermediate nodes. The study with this constraint is much desired for the practical viewpoint.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
When k = r, it is trivial. When k = r+1, we do not need to make any algebraic extension because it is sufficient
to choose m vectors v1, . . . , vr ∈ Fkq such that vi,j with j = 1, . . . , r is δi,j and vi,r+1 is 1.
Now, we consider the case when k > r + 1. When q > p, we choose element e1, . . . , et such that Fq is given
as Fp[e1, . . . , et]. When t < k − 2, we make further algebraic extension Fp[e1, . . . , ek−2] by adding elements
et+1, . . . , ek−2. Now, we denote 1 by e0. Then, we choose m vectors v1, . . . , vr ∈ Fp[e1, . . . , ek−2]k by
vi,j :=

δi,j when j ≤ r
1 when j = r + 1
ei+j−r−2 when j > r + 1.
(77)
We can show that the r vectors v1, . . . , vr satisfy the required condition as follows. Choose the function s such
that s(1) < . . . < s(r). It is sufficient to show that the vector (v1,s(r), . . . , vr,s(r)) cannot be written as a linear
combination of (v1,s(1), . . . , vr,s(1)), . . . , (v1,s(r−1), . . . , vr,s(r−1)). When s(r) = r or r + 1, it is trivial. So, we
show the case when s(r) > r + 1. Since all entries of vi,s(j) belong to Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)−2], we choose coefficients
α1, . . . , αr ∈ Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)−2] such that
∑m
i=1 αivj,s(i) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , r. We show the desired statement by
assuming αr = 1.
For i = 1, . . . , r − 1, we divide the coefficient αi into r parts, i.e., we choose αi,j ∈ Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)+j−r−2] \
Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)+j−r−3] as αi =
∑r
j=1 αi,j . Since we have
∑r−1
i=1 αivj,s(i) = −es(r)+j−r−2 ∈ Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)+j−r−2]
for j = 1, . . . , r, we have
∑r−1
i=1 αi,j′vj,s(i) = 0 for j
′ > j because αi,j′ /∈ Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)+j−r−2] and vj,s(i) ∈
Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)+j−r−2].
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That is, the vectors α(j′) := (α1,j′ , . . . , αr,j′)T for j′ = 1, . . . , r and β(j) := (vj,s(1), . . . , vj,s(r))T for j =
1, . . . , r − 1 satisfy the conditions:
(α(j′),β(j)) = 0 for j′ > j (78)
j∑
j′=1
(α(j′),β(j)) = −es(r)+j−r−2. (79)
Since
∑j−1
j′=1(α(j
′),β(j)) ∈ Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)+j−r−3], and−es(r)+j−r−2( 6= 0) /∈ Fp[e1, . . . , es(r)+j−r−3], (α(j),β(j)) 6=
0.
We define γ(j) = β(j)−∑j−1i=1 (α(i),β(j))(α(i),β(i))β(i). Then, for i 6= j we have
(α(i),γ(j)) =
{
0 when i 6= j
(α(j),γ(j)) 6= 0 when i = j. (80)
Hence, we find that γ(1), . . . ,γ(r− 1) are linearly independent. Since (α(r),γ(j)) = 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1, we
have α(r) = 0, which implies es(r)−2 = 0. So, we obtain contradiction.
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